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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since the 1980s, income inequality has been on the rise in most developed economies.
In last decade, this phenomenon has increasingly drawn the attention of policymakers and
researchers, to such an extent that it was labeled "the defining challenge of our time" by
president Obama.1
Beyond being an ethical issue, it is mainly an economic one. Recent studies on the
consequences of income inequality show its negative effect on economic growth [7].
In particular, economists investigate the causes of income inequality in order to mitigate
them and ensure an efficient transmission of fiscal and monetary policy.
Despite the increasing focus on this topic, central bankers have often overlooked the
possible interaction between monetary policy and the growing income inequality, until
very recently.
The main reason is that primary objective of central banks is the price and financial
stability, whereas redistribution falls within the competence of fiscal policymakers.
Quoting Benoît Coeuré (2012): "The task of the ECB under the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union is to ensure price stability in the medium term. It thus focuses
on income and wealth stabilisation rather than on the allocation of economic resources, or
on redistribution."
However, even though the distribution effects are not a clear mandate of central banks,
financial analysis is normally conducted to gain a thorough outlook of the economic
scenario, and in turn to achieve the monetary policy goals in the most efficient way.
In this sense, they assess real activity and financial conditions, taking into account distri-
butional features.
For example, the European Central Bank (ECB) regularly reviews the fiscal policy, output
1stated in occasion of a speech sponsored by the Center for American Progress, December 04, 2013.
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and labour market conditions with the intent of evaluating the short to medium-term
determinants of price movements.
As some of the most relevant ECB’ s authorities stated:
"From a central banker’ s perspective, the most relevant aspects of recent works con-
cern the assessment that monetary policy can have sizeable distributional effects. Indeed,
inequality has been largely ignored in discussions of monetary policy. But this might be
changing." Yves Mersch (17 October 2014)
"Because the use of new instruments can have different consequences than conventional
monetary policy, in particular with respect to the distribution of wealth and the allocation
of resources, it has become more important that those consequences are identified, weighed
and where necessary mitigated." Mario Draghi (14 May 2015)
Although studies on this matter are already available, the public debate is still ongoing
as empirical conclusions appear still doubtful and in some cases contradictory to definitively
answer the entire problem.
It proves to be complicated to isolate the issue and to obtain clear results.
The aim of the thesis is to contribute to the debate by evaluating the effect of monetary
policy on income inequality in the Euro area, during the period from January 1999 to
December 2015.
In order to better analyse the monetary policy during the entire sample period and compare
the unconventional monetary policy implemented in recent years to the conventional one
(that typically characterised the pre-financial crisis years), we employ a panel data model.
With respect to the existing literature this work aims to integrate empirical analysis
with three main element of novelty:
• First, to capture the effect of unconventional monetary policies in the period of low
interest rates after the crisis 2008, we used the shadow interest rate proposed by Wu
and Xia (a new tool in the monetary policy analysis);
• Secondly, most of the current studies focused on the Federal Reserve (FED) or other
central banks, instead the study of the effect of ECB’ s monetary policy on income
inequality is still at its origins;
• Lastly, since the Gini index is available only in annual frequency (for this reason
we use the annual basis for all variables), we employed a panel data model of 11
European economies to cope with small length of time series and to consider the
heterogeneity of European countries.
3The results suggest a negative effect of the shadow interest rate on Gini coefficient.
In particular, an increase (decrease) in the shadow rate leads to a decrease (increase)
in Gini coefficient. From these considerations, a restrictive (expansive) monetary policy
associated to an increase (decrease) in the shadow rate leads to a decrease (increase) in
income inequality.
This paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the main literature and explains
the most relevant topics for the research; Chapter 3 describes the econometric model,
reviewing the theoretical framework and its implications; Chapter 4 illustrates the data and
empirical methodology; Chapter 5 shows the results and robustness checks; last chapter
draws conclusions.
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
As previously introduced, the literature is at the beginning of the analysis, actually
there are not so many empirical studies, in particular for the Euro area.
Now follows a briefly summary of the main literature that supported this thesis. Most of
researches focus on the United States as Romer and Romer (1999), Coibon et al. (2012),
Karen Davtyan (2016) and Nakajima (2015). They obtained different results as follows:
• Using first the United States (US) and then a large sample of countries, Romer and
Romer (1999) study the effect of monetary policy on poverty and inequality.
They analyse for both the short and long run. The time-series from the US shows
that expansionary monetary policy can lead to better conditions for the poor in the
short run but at the same time monetary policy cannot produce permanent positive
effect.
The cross-country analysis suggests that introducing monetary policy with the aim
to decrease inflation and stabilise aggregate demand is the best way to improve
conditions for the poor in the long run;
• Coibion et al. (2012), focusing on the FED, show that contractionary monetary
policy shocks have enlarged income inequality.
Moreover they summarise five transmission channels through which these policies
can have distributional consequences:
1) income composition channel : since there are different sources of income, monetary
policy can affect them in different way. Actually high income households rely more
in financial earnings than the poor that receive the most of income from labour
earnings.
But since the monetary policy affects more the prices of assets can lead to a better
conditions for the rich;
5
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2) earnings heterogeneity channel : the inclination of the low income households to
be more affected by economic cycle;
3) portfolio channel : the high income households holds more securities compare to
the poor thus they can gain more from a expansionary monetary policy that can
lead to an increase of asset prices;
4) the savings redistribution channel : a decrease of interest rates can change the
nominal position of an individual. It can lead to a benefit for a borrower;
5) financial segmentation channel : since there are individuals more related to financial
markets than other, they can benefit more from monetary policy shocks;
• Using Gini coefficient as measure for income inequality, Karen Davtyan (2016)
examines the effect of conventional and unconventional monetary policy for the US.
In particular, considering the large scale asset purchases, he accepts that these
policies have modified the supply of short term and long term bonds and other assets,
changing their prices.
But since usually the wealthy hold these assets, this can lead to a benefit for high
income households.
The paper shows that the effect of expansionary non conventional policy increases
the income inequality then the contractionary conventional one decreases it, but the
effect of conventional monetary policy appears stronger than unconventional one;
• Starting from the paper by Coibon et al., Nakajima identifies two main general
distributive channels of monetary policy.
One is the inflation channel that incorporates the financial segmentation, the portfolio
and the savings redistribution channels.
Second is the income channel that incorporates the income composition and the
earnings heterogeneity channels.
Inflation channel is identified with prices while income channel with the gross domestic
product (GDP).
In addition to the studies on the US, Saiki and Frost (2014) focus on the effect of
unconventional monetary policy on income inequality in Japan.
The paper shows that unconventional policies increased income inequality, in particular
through portfolio channel.
Saiki and Frost declared that if unconventional monetary policy had an important role to
restore financial market, these policies affected income distribution rising financial gain for
high income households.
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2.1 Income Inequality
Looking at figures 2.1 and 2.2 on the next page, that describes the trend of top 1%
and 10% income share for some OECD countries, considering them as measures of income
inequality, since the 1980s it is easy to observe an increasing trend.
Figure 2.1: Top 1% National Income Share, source World Income Database.
Although income inequality is rising on the whole, there are some differences on the
movements in single countries.
According to this, looking at figures 2.3 on the following page and 2.4 on page 9; while
income inequality, measured by Gini index, has been steadily increasing in Italy and Spain
or even declining as in France, differently in Australia, Japan, United Kingdom and the
US where decisively increasing.
In particular since the 1999, the Gini coefficient has been relatively stable in the
European countries as shown in figure 2.5 on page 10.
In this sense, it can be useful observing the Gini coefficient in the 1980 and in the 2014 for
the countries belong to euro zone (those used in this thesis) compare, for example, to the
US and Japan.
As shown in figure 2.6 on page 10, the values in the 2014 for the US and Japan is decisively
increase relative to European Monetary Union (EMU) countries that show a low increase
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Figure 2.2: Top 10% National Income Share, source World Income Database.
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Source: Standardized World Income Inequality Database v6.0 (Solt 2016).
Figure 2.3: SWIID Gini Index on Disposable Income: Australia, Japan; United Kingdom
and United States.
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or even a decrease as for France, Greece and Ireland.
Similarly, looking at the figure 2.5 on the following page, the increasing trend of Gini
coefficient during the period 1999-2015 (the sample period considered for the thesis) for
the European countries is nearly absent.
Furthermore, it useful observing in 2.7 on page 11 that Gini index on market income for
the countries of our dataset exhibits an higher increase then Gini on disposable income 2.5
on the following page.
This shows that the distribution of income before taxes and transfers present higher
inequality.
Through the two figures we can observe this difference between gross and net Gini index.
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Figure 2.4: SWIID Gini Index on Disposable Income: France, Germany, Italy and Spain.
Income inequality is defined as a measure of income concentration. There are different
measures to evaluate income inequality. The main indicator among researchers is the Gini
coefficient.
Gini index measures the deviation within a country of the distribution of income among
households from a perfectly equal distribution.
It was introduced by Corrado Gini and it is the most popular measure to evaluate income
inequality. The Gini coefficient describes the area between the line of perfect equality and
Lorenz curve. A Lorenz curve indicates the cumulative percentages of income hold by the
cumulative number of individuals, starting from the poorest ones.
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Figure 2.5: Gini coefficient on disposable (net) income, source Standardised World Income
Database for our dataset.
Figure 2.6: Net Gini Index, comparison between countries of our dataset and US and
Japan, source Standardised World Income Inequality for our dataset.
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It is a distributional measure and it describes the overall inequality, considering the
entire population and it lies between 0 and 1 (sometimes is considered a scale from 0 to
100).
Full inequality corresponds to value 1, where all the income is associated to only one
individual. Otherwise we have a situation of perfect equality, when the coefficient indicate
a 0 value, in which all individuals receive the same amount of income.
In addition to Gini coefficient, researchers employ percentiles and deciles, evaluating
what share of income goes to a certain percentage of population.
As opposed to the Gini coefficient, these measures take into account only one part of the
entire population.
Often among researchers, talking about deciles, it is useful to consider the ratio between
the ninth decile (i.e. the 10% of people with highest income) to that of first decile (i.e.
the 10% of people with lowest income).
In this thesis we decided to use only Gini coefficient for two main reasons: first, it is the
only measure that is available from 1999 to 2015 for our sample; second, it takes into
account all the population.
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Figure 2.7: Gini coefficient on market (gross) income, source Standardised World Income
Database for our dataset.
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2.2 The ECB’s Monetary Policy
2.2.1 Conventional Monetary Policy
The ECB’ s primary objective, sanctioned on the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, is to maintain price stability.
Focusing on this target, the ECB aims at maintaining inflation rates below, but close to
2% over the medium term.
The ECB has defined price stability as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of
Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area.
In order to reach its task, ECB controls the short interest rates, thus, influencing the
economy, it indirectly steers the inflation to its target in the medium term.
Furthermore, the ECB adopts a specific strategy to decide the value of interest rates. In
this sense, it conducts two main analysis to take monetary decisions: economic analysis
and monetary analysis.
The economic analysis evaluates the determinants of price developments in the short-
medium term instead the monetary analysis identifies them in the long term. This strategy
is based on the idea that in the sort and medium term inflation arises from the interaction
between supply and demand in the financial and real markets instead the monetary base
steers the inflation in the long term.
The official interest rates adopted by the ECB’s Governing Council are:
• The interest rate on the main refinancing operations (MROs), the most relevant
interest rate that signals the ECB’s monetary policy stance;
• The rate on the marginal lending facility;
• The rate on deposit facility.
The main monetary policy instruments include:
• open market operations: they are the main instruments adopted by ECB. They
include the main refinancing operations that provide the liquidity with maturity of a
week and they are considered the main measures to steer the ECB’ s monetary policy.
The long term refinancing operations (LTRO) have a maturity of three months thus
they give an addition long term refinancing possibility to financial institutions;
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• standing facilities : all the time monetary institutions can borrow liquidity from ECB,
after presentation of eligible assets as collateral with an higher interest then MROs.
There are two main standing facilities operations. The marginal lending facilities
provide overnight liquidity from the ECB while the deposit facilities are operations
that give the possibility to the banks to make overnight deposit with the central
bank;
• required reserves : the ECB demands that financial institutions in the euro area hold
minimum reserves on accounts with their national central banks.
2.2.2 Unconventional Monetary Policy
During the beginning of the crisis erupted in 2007, the main breakdown was due to
malfunction of monetary market, increasing uncertainty of the liquidity among banks.
But since September 2008, the intensification of the crisis has sharply accentuated anxieties
in the money market.
In this context, the ECB responded assuming a fundamental role providing the liquidity
to the single banks.
Aa a matter of fact, the ECB started to conduct MROs through auctions with fixed rate,
providing all the liquidity asked by banks.
Starting from the collapse of US sub-prime mortgage market, central banks employed
unconventional monetary policies in order to cope with the increasing financial instability.
In addition to the regular conventional LTROs, since march 2008, the ECB implemented
the LTROs with longer maturity.
To cope with rising illiquidity in the euro area system the ECB introduced the LTROs
with six month maturity and then in may 2009 it extended the maturity until one year.
Notably, between the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012, the ECB provided one
thousand billions with a 1% rate for the European banks.
Furthermore, other measures were employed, intervening directly to some securities
markets.
The Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP) was announced on 7 may 2009, it aimed
to ease credit conditions for the banks in the euro area.
On 10 May 2010, the ECB announced the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), respond-
ing to the rising worries on the government bonds market.
As a matter of fact, markets started to mistrust the solvency of the governments with
high deficit in the euro zone. In this context, the ECB decided to start with purchases of
government bonds in the secondary markets.
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All of these operations under the SMP were sterilised with absorbing measures.
On 2 August 2012 the ECB announced the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), they
consists in unlimited purchases of government bonds with short maturity (1 and 3 years)
under the EFSF/ESM1 programme.
"Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro.
And believe me, it will be enough" Mario Draghi (26 July 2012)
This intervention helped to restore the bonds market and to guarantee a good mon-
etary policy transmission.
In order to safeguard and increasing the support to reach the price stability, ECB extended
its non standard measures to both private and public sector, employing the so called asset
purchase programme (APP).
It includes the following programmes:
• Third covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3) started on 20 October 2014
buying covered bonds. This programme started after the first covered bond purchase
programme (CBPP1) in 2009 and the second covered bond purchase programme
(CBPP2) in 2011;
• The asset-backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP) was introduced on 21
November 2014;
• On 9 March 2015 the ECB started to buy public sector securities with the introduction
of public sector purchase programme (PSPP);
• Corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP) was introduced on 8 June 2016.
The targeted longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) were an other measure
adopted by ECB in order to enlarge its accommodative monetary policies and reinforce the
good transmission of monetary policy. They provided further liquidity to credit institutions
up to four years.
The first programme of this measure was introduced on June 2014 and a second programme
on March 2016.
A first series of TLTROs was announced on 5 June 2014 and a second series (TLTRO II)
1the European Financial stability Facility (EFSF) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the
intergovernmental organisations to safeguard and provide a financial sustain for euro zone countries in
financial distress.
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on 10 March 2016.
They are called targeted because the liquidity that credit institutions could borrow is
related to their loans to real economy (non-financial corporations and households).
2.3 Shadow Interest Rate
As previously described, the main monetary policy instrument is the short interest
rate. Policy makers handle it to steer monetary policy and control inflation.
Central banks lower it in order to sustain the economy and increase it to slow down activity.
Since the beginning of the last financial crisis, most of the central banks cut the policy
rates close to 0, reaching the so-called Zero Lower Bound (ZLB)2.
Consequently monetary policymakers, who cannot lower the policy rate further, introduced
different unconventional policies to stimulate the economy even more.
Hence, this new monetary policy environment with the introduction of new monetary
measures along with the reduction of policy rate up to 0, made the evaluation of the
monetary policy stance more complicated.
Figure 2.8: Shadow Interest Rate.
Among researchers it was common to use the policy rate as measure of the monetary
2the situation where the short-term interest policy rate is at or near 0.
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policy guidance, but since unconventional monetary policies are not reflected in the main
refinancing operations rate, thus it can not be used as policy measure.
In this sense in order to capture the unconventional monetary policy effects, we adopted
the Shadow Interest Rate proposed by Jing Cynthia Wu and Fan Dora Xia3.
This rate is developed for the FED, the Bank of England and for the ECB.
When the policy rates are above the zero lower bound, the shadow rate is nearly the
same of the MROs rate otherwise when the policy rates reach the zero lower bound and in
particular with the adoption of unconventional measures, using an unobserved components
model and taking informations from term structure of interest rates, the Wu-Xia shadow
rate becomes negative.
In this way, it is possible to use an effective rate to measure the monetary policy stance
during the entire period, considering both the conventional and unconventional monetary
policy.
As shown in the figure 2.8, with the introduction of SLTROs (2009) and LTROs (2011),
the Wu-Xia shadow rate reached negative values. Furthermore the ECB shadow rate
dropped in negative territory in 2012, following the announcement of OMT operations
and their implementation.
Finally the shadow interest rate moved sharply negative when the ECB started with
Quantitative Easing programme during 2015.
3Measuring the Macroeconomic Impact of Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound, available at
https://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2015/arc/pdf/Xia.pdf.
Chapter 3
Econometric Model
3.1 Panel Data Model
Panel data models refer to data that are related to a set of individuals observed over
two or more periods of time.
They are also called "cross-sectional time series data" because they result from the union
of cross-sectional and time series data.
In this sense panel data models are based on two dimensions: the N dimension that
indicates individuals, whereas T specifies the time dimension.
If T is equal for all N cross-sectional units, panel data is balanced.
Studies of microeconometric problems rather than macroeconometric ones lead to distin-
guish between two type of panel data as the different set of data used in the two settings.
Microeconometric panel data are based on a setting with a N dimension greater then T,
instead macroeconometric panel data models relay on T greater than N. This distinction
is relevant for the properties of the estimator.
There are several advantages employing panel data rather then the single times series or
cross sectional data models.
First, panel models allow to consider more data (NxT ), benefiting from an increase in
efficiency of parameters estimates; furthermore, including more information, they can
control for unobserved heterogeneity among individuals.
Time series analysis does not allow to control for this type of individual heterogeneity, not
even the cross-section analysis can study it because often this factors are unobservable.
Only with panel data structure, even in absence of specific informations this unobserved
heterogeneity can be included in the model.
Consequently, panel models show variability both for the time dimension and for the
cross-sectional one.
Aforementioned variability can be represented considering the error term as the summary
17
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of three different components: a simple pure component υit, the error term is composed
of an unobservable time-invariant component αi and an unobservable component λt that
varies over time and it is the same among individuals.
εit = αi + λi + υit, (3.1)
The presence of only one component between αi and λt produces the so called "one
way" models, whereas the "two way" models consider both the components.
These models allow to control for unobserved features, as cultural and geographic factors,
different business models among companies or national policies.
As a matter of fact, the main problem that arises when estimating the model with
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator is to control for unobservable characteristics that
may correlate with the variables included in the regression.
The phenomenon of omitted variables is very common and causes a problem of endogeneity
but it can be solved using the panel data.
Two main complications arise when these models are employed: first, estimators are
inconsistent when regressors cannot be considered strictly exogenous; second, in the
presence of cross section dependence where errors are correlated to different cross section
units, the results can lead to misleading inference.
3.1.1 Panel Data with Strictly Exogenous Regressors
Considering yit as the observation on the i
th individual unit at time t for i = 1,2,...,N ;
t = 1,2,...,T, the following is a panel data regression model
yit = αi + β
′xit + υit, (3.2)
where αi describes an unobservable, individual time-invariant effect, xit identifies k×1
vector of observed unit individual regressors on the ith cross-sectional unit, β is the k -
dimensional vector of unknown parameters and υit is the individual error term at time t.
The unit-specific effect αi accounts for the individual time-invariant effect that is not
considered in the regression [8].
For these regressions and estimators, it is assumed that E(υit | Xi.) = 0, for all i and t,
thus all the regressors are assumed strictly exogenous.
In this sense, the error term is assumed to be uncorrelated with all lags of explanatory
variables.
Starting from this baseline panel data observations we can use two main models: Fixed
effect model and Random effect model.
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Fixed Effect Model
Before introducing the two models we describe the simple and basic one for panel data.
The pooled OLS model exploits the OLS properties. Pooled OLS can be described as
yit = β
′xit + υit, (3.3)
where yit is the observation of dependent variable for the cross-sectional unit i at period t,
xit is a vector 1×k of independent variables, β is a vector of k×1 parameters and υit is
the error term.
But this model presents a relevant disadvantage, indeed for the validity of the model,
the individual specific effect αi is assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors, thus
E(xitαi) = 0.
If this correlation is present, the pooled OLS model will be inconsistent, leading to the so
called "heterogeneity bias".
The bias is due to the omission of the time-invariant variable [9].
In the Fixed Effect model (FE), αi the time-invariant variable is considered to be
correlated with the regressors, thus this model only requires that the explanatory variables
are strictly exogenous E(υit | Xi.) = 0.
Starting from (3.2), the main idea of FE is to estimate β after eliminating the individual
effect. Applying the average over time in the (3.2)
y¯i. = α¯i + β
′x¯i. + υ¯i., (3.4)
where y¯i., x¯i. and υ¯i. are the averages over time.
FE model subtracts (3.4) from (3.2) obtaining the following equation:
yit − y¯i. = β
′(xit − x¯i.) + (υit − υ¯i.), (3.5)
This is known as fixed effect or within estimator (within transformation). In order to
estimate β, pooled OLS is applied to the above equation (3.5).
It can be computed the within estimator including N dummy variables for each unit as in
the following regression:
y =
n∑
i=1
αidi +Xβ + υ, (3.6)
where di is an NT × 1 vector of a dummy variable composed by all its elements equal to
zero except for the elements that correspond to the ith cross sectional unit.
Using this method the estimator is called the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV).
β, employing the LSDV model, is estimated using OLS and it corresponds to the same
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estimate using the FE estimator.
Random Effect Model
Contrary to the FE, the Random Effect model (RE) assumes that the individual
specific effects are uncorrelated with the regressors, E(αi | Xi.) = 0.
The individual-specific effects are considered as realisations from a probability distribution
function with a fixed number of parameters, distributed independently of the independent
variables.
To obtain unbiased and efficient estimates, RE model applies the Feasible Generalised
Least Squares (FGLS) technique, thus first transforming the model an than applying the
OLS.
The transformation is equal to a "nearly differentiation":
yit − θy¯i. = (1− θ)αi + β
′(xit − θx¯i.) + (υit − θυ¯i.), (3.7)
It is clear that if θ= 1, FGLS estimator corresponds to LSDV estimator.
To guarantee the consistency of the RE estimator, regressors should not be correlated to
the individual-specific term αi.
Otherwise the assumption E(εit | Xi.) = 0 would be violated.
This assumption is not relevant in the FE model where the individual specific effect αi
has not a distribution.
Consequently the disadvantage of RE model is to support this assumption, that sometimes
can appear doubtful to keep.
For example, in the macroeconomic context, FE model seems to be more appropriate
then RE model: first, if the individual effect αi represents omitted variables, the specific
characteristics of countries probably appear to be correlated to the other regressors; second,
it is difficult to think that the selected countries originate from a random panel because
usually they are the most part of the countries used for the specific research.
Driskoll and Kraay Estimator
According to Pesaran (2015), heterogeneity across units was confined to unit-specific
intercepts, treated as fixed or random.
With the increasing availability of data (across countries, regions, or industries), the panel
literature moved from predominantly micro panels, where the cross dimension (N ) is large
and the time series dimension (T ) is small, to models with both N and T large, and it
has been recognised that, even after conditioning on unit-specific regressors, individual
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units, in general, need not be cross-sectionally independent.
Ignoring cross-sectional dependence of errors can have serious consequences, and the
presence of some form of cross-section correlation of errors in panel data applications in
economics is likely to be the rule rather than the exception.
In line with the above literature, it is often not feasible suppose the presence of
cross sectional independence of error terms in a panel data model, in particular in the
macroeconomic context.
In this sense, ignoring the presence of cross sectional dependence can lead to bias estimates
of the standard panel estimators.1
As a matter of fact, supposing that the unobservable common factors are uncorrelated
with explanatory variables, these estimates remain consistent but become inefficient.
In order to obtain statistical relevant results, taking into account cross sectional dependence
in the residuals, research developed adjustments in standard errors.
Starting from this problem, Driscoll and Kraay (1998) studied a nonparametric covariance
matrix estimation producing heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors that are robust
to general cross sectional dependence.
The Stata software provides some corrections to cope with violating assumptions of the
econometric model when there is the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
Daniel Hoecle2 developed the program xtscc in Stata, correcting standard errors with
Driskoll and Kraay estimator, with the aim to perform pooled OLS or fixed effects (within)
regression models.
With this new Stata programme, he added the possibility to apply the Driskoll and Kraay’s
covariance matrix estimator to the unbalanced panel data models.
Considering the Driskoll and Kraay’s conclusions for small balanced panel data models, the
Monte Carlo experiments by Daniel Hoecle showed that disregarding the cross sectional
dependence in a panel data can lead to overestimate the standard errors.
Even the Driskoll and Kraay’s estimator lightly overvalues the estimates of the standard
errors, however it performs better than the standard estimators in the presence of cross
sectional dependence.
Starting from the assumption that it is inappropriate assuming that residuals of a panel
data model are cross sectional independent, it is often better to consider correlation
between and within groups, especially in the macroeconomic framework.
Driskoll and Kraay ’s (1998) formulation shows as the standard time series covariance
matrix estimator can be adjusted to cross sectional dependence in order to obtain robust
estimates.
This methodology allows the error structure to be heteroscedastic, autocorrelated and
1e.g. fixed effects (Fe) estimator, random effects (Re) estimator, or pooled OLS estimation.
2Daniel Hoechle, University of Basel, Robust Standard Errors for Panel Regressions with Cross-Sectional
Dependence, The Stata Journal.
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with cross-sectional dependence.
The Stata programme xtscc with fe option applies the within estimator (fixed effects
regression model), considering Driskoll and Kraay’s covariance matrix of the standard
errors.
To do so, when fe option is applied, the Stata command xtscc works in two steps.
Firstly it modifies variables using xtreg, thus applying the within transformation
z˜it = zit − z¯i + z¯. (3.8)
Given that the within-estimator coincides to the OLS-estimator of:
y˜it = x˜
′
itθ + ε˜it, (3.9)
the second step of the comand estimates the transformed regression (3.9) by pooled OLS
estimation with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors.
3.1.2 Dynamic Panel Data Model
In addition to the static panel data model, often we are interested to examine the
dynamic behaviour.
In this sense, we have to include the lagged dependent variables in the generating model
in order to capture the dynamic attitude.
As a consequence of increasing disposable data, during last decade there was a growing
interest on these kind of models.
However, even if we are not interested to estimate the coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable, dynamic panel model can be fundamental to obtain consistent estimates of the
other parameters.
As a matter of fact, if we don’t consider this dynamic behaviour when is significant, we
get biased estimates.
Although these models can better describe the dynamic dependence among variables, an
endogeneity problem can occur when we employ them.
The presence of lagged values of the dependent variable, yi,t−1, among the regressors will
be correlated with the unit-specific effects, αi, whether they are fixed or random, and with
lagged uit.
Dynamic panel model with one lagged dependent variable, yi,t−1, and the regressors,
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xit
3, follows this structure:
yit = ρyi,t−1 + x
′
itβ + (αi + υit) (3.10)
Consequently both OLS and FGLS estimates are biased.
Actually in the case of pooled OLS, the bias concerns the correlation between dependent
variable and the specific-individual effect αi (if yit correlates with αi, yit−1 correlates with
it as well).
Considering the LSDV estimator, the differentiation drops out the αi term,
yit − y¯i. = β
′(xit − x¯i.) + (υit − υ¯i.), (3.11)
in this case the bias arise from the correlation between the lagged dependent variable
yi,t−1 and the lagged error term υit−1 that contributes to develop υ¯i.
The bias decreases with increasing of time periods T because the υit−1 term will less
contribute to shape υ¯i..
The strategy to cope with the endogeneity problem is based on taking into account for
instrumental variables.
The main characteristics of these variables are the uncorrelation with error term and the
correlation with variables that show endogeneity.
In this sense, it is developed a regression of original variables using instrumental variables.
Then, substituting the estimates, it can be applied OLS to the model. It is developed a so
called Two Stages Least Square (2SLS).
The main problem is linked to identify the correct instruments to employ in the model,
remembering that the number of instruments has to be equal or greater then endogeneity
variables.
Wide literature has examined the problem of endogeneity in dynamic panel models,
introducing instrumental variables method (IV) and the Generalised Method of Moments
(GMM).
Anderson and Hsiao, starting from the following model 4
yit = λyi,t−1 + β
′xit + εit, (3.12)
εit = αi + υit, (3.13)
introduced an IV method. Actually, applying the first difference to eliminate the
individual-specific effect αi,
∆yit = λ∆yi,t−1 + β
′∆xit +∆υit, (3.14)
3
xit are strictly exogenous, thus uncorrelated with νit.
4
αi and υi are assumed to be independent of each other.
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the endogeneity problem remains E(∆yi,t−1∆υit) 6= 0.
To deal with the correlation between∆yit,t−1 and∆υit, Anderson and Hsiao (1981) proposed
employing an instrumental variables (IV) method.
Considering that E(yi,t−2∆υit) = 0 and given that yi,t−2 correlates with ∆yi,t−1, then yi,t−2
can be a valid instrument for ∆yi,t−1.
Arellano and Bond extended the literature on the dynamic panel models.
Differently from Anderson and Hsiao, Arellano and Bond (1991) consider that additional
instruments can be used to cope with above mentioned endogeneity problem.
They proposed a GMM approach based on all available moment conditions.
Starting from:
yi3 − yi2 = λ(yi2 − yi1) + β
′∆xi3 +∆υi3, (3.15)
yi4 − yi3 = λ(yi3 − yi2) + β
′∆xi4 +∆υi4, (3.16)
yi5 − yi4 = λ(yi4 − yi3) + β
′∆xi5 +∆υi5, (3.17)
... (3.18)
yiT − yi,T−1 = λ(yi,T−1 − yi,T−2) + β
′∆xiT +∆υiT , (3.19)
In equation (3.15), yi1 is a valid instrument for yi2 − yi1; in equation (3.16), yi1 and yi2
are valid instruments for yi3−yi2; in equation (3.17), yi1,yi2 and yi3 are valid instruments for
yi4−yi3 and so on until the equation (3.19) where the valid instruments are yi1,yi2,...,yi,T−2.
In this way, for each additional time period, there is an additional valid instrument.
Bias Corrected LSDV Estimator
A common feature among IV and GMM estimators is the weakness of their properties
for panel data models with a small number of individuals, as is the case for macroeconomic
panel data.
With the increasing interest for the dynamic panel models, partly thanks to the improving
of the data availability, it was proposed a different approach to cope the problem of small
sample.
Since the LSDV estimator is unbiased in the presence of lagged dependent variable, it has
a relatively small dispersion compared to the other estimators.
LSDV’s dispersion is often smaller compared to that of Anderson and Hsiao’s estimator
with instrumental variables and GMM that are consistent with N→∞ .
Nickell (1981) suggested an expression of order T−1 for the inconsistency of LSDV for N,
in the presence of the lagged dependent variable. But this expression did not consider of
all terms that provide LSDV’ bias.
Alongside the term of order T−1, Kiviet (1995) studied even the terms of orderN−1T−1
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and N−1T−2. Consequently, to obtain a corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC), the above
terms are subtracted to the LSDV estimate.
The Monte Carlo experiment by Judson and Owen (1999) strongly suggest LSDVC when
the number of individuals N is small as in the macro context.
Bruno (2005) extended the Bun and Kiviet (2003) studies to the unbalanced panels.
Furthermore, Bruno has proposed a Stata command xtlsdvc 5 that implements LSDVC
based on the approximation proposed by Bruno (2005).
Through a Monte Carlo experiment, Bruno (2005) showed the performance of LSDVC com-
pared to LSDV, Arellano and Bond estimator, Anderson and Hsiao estimator and Bundel
and Bover estimator for unbalanced panel data model with small number of individu-
als N (10 and 20 cross sectional units), broadening the studies by Judson and Owen (1999).
5Giovanni S. F. Bruno (2005), Estimation and Inference in Dynamic Unbalanced Panel Data Models
with a Small Number of Individual.
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Chapter 4
Data and Empirical Model
This part shows the structure of the data and applied methodology, following the above
literature and the available dataset.
In order to obtain the correct estimates of the unknown parameters, we have developed
many models and tests.
4.1 Dataset and Model Specification
In order to analyse the effect of ECB’s monetary policy on income inequality we
considered the period from January 1999 to December 2015.
Choosing the first countries in the Euro area with higher GDP, we selected a panel of
11 countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain.
Since 1 January 1999 the ECB started to implement monetary policy in the euro area,
however the European Monetary Union (EMU) countries continued to maintain their fiscal
policy.
In this sense, even if we are interested in the role of monetary policy, we developed a panel
data model in order to capture the differences among EMU countries.
We selected the entire period in which the ECB has operated, in order to analyse the
overall monetary policy relying, on more available data.
The dependent variable of the model is the GINI coefficient that identifies income
inequality. It is available only in annual frequency, consequently all the variables in the
model are taken in annual basis.
The collecting data and the preparation of the dataset are two important parts in the
analysis. As a matter of fact, starting from valid dataset we can run a correct research.
Following this consideration we used reliable database such as the OECD database and
the Standardised World Income Inequality (SWIID) database.
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Even if Gini coefficient is not the only instrument used by researchers to study income
inequality, it is the only income inequality measure with available data for our dataset.
One of the main problem, studying the income inequality, is the comparability of the
available data among different database. In order to solve this problem, it was developed
the SWIID.
As described in Solt (2016), the SWIID aims to unify the overall data from the most
important income inequality database, maximising the comparability of available data and
increase the availability for many countries.
Indeed the SWIID uses a algorithm to standardise observations collected from the OECD
Income Distribution Database, the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the
Caribbean, Eurostat, the World Bank, national statistical offices around the world, and
many other sources. Luxembourg Income Study data serves as the standard. For the
purpose of our thesis we adopted the SWIID as database for the Gini coefficient, taking
advantage of its properties of international comparability and inclusion of incomes from
different sources.
For the macroeconomics variables we followed the paper by Nakajima that, starting
from the paper by Coibon et al. (2012), identifies two main general distributive channels
of monetary policy.
One is the inflation channel that incorporates the financial segmentation, the portfolio
and the savings redistribution channels.
Second is the income channel that incorporates the income composition and the earnings
heterogeneity channel.
Inflation channel is identified with prices while income channel with the GDP.
Following the above considerations, we selected as independent variables the real growth
GDP 1 and the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 2
• GDPit: this measures the annual variation of GDP in the country i at time t, this
variable should affect the distributional variable Gini, given that an higher GDP
influences the economy, boosting the demand for goods, influencing the investments
end employment, improving conditions in general but in particular for the low income
households.
• CPIit: this measures the inflation in the country i at time t, this variable should
affect the distributional variable Gini, given that for example an increase in inflation
1is GDP given in constant prices and refers to the volume level of GDP. This indicator is measured in
growth rates compared to previous year, OECD database.
2Inflation measured by consumer price index (CPI) is defined as the change in the prices of a basket of
goods and services that are typically purchased by specific groups of households. Inflation is measured in
terms of the annual growth rate and in index, 2010 base year, OECD database.
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transfers wealth from households with nominal assets to those with nominal debt.
Thinking that most of low income households hold more debts, the inflation should
affect positively Gini coefficient.
Furthermore we added to the model the Unemployment rate (Harmonised Unemployment
Rate)3
• Uit: this is the unemployment rate in the country i at time t, this variable should
affect positively Gini coefficient.
As monetary policy measure, we adopted the shadow interest rate proposed by Xia
and Wu as previously mentioned in section 2.2.1.
This instrument is the best choice to capture the overall monetary policy since the MRO’s
rate is not able to measure the monetary policy after the introduction of unconventional
policies.
As previously described, the shadow rate moves in two main directions: when the policy
rate remains positive above 0 the rate follows the MRO’s rate, at the contrary when the
MRO’s reaches the Zero Lower Bound the Shadow Interest Rate moves in negative area.
With the aim to analyse possible structural breaks in the model, we added a dummy
variable (d2008 ) that accounts for the possible impact of the financial crisis.
Furthermore, we include the interaction effects between the dummy d2008 and the macroe-
conomics variables in order to investigate possible changes during the entire sample period.
Including the dummy variable and the interaction effect we should obtain better results.
Considering the above variables the model is:
Git = β1 GDPit + β2 CPIit + β3 Uit + β4 S_ratet + β5 d2008 + β6 dGDP + β7
dCPI + β8 dU + αi + εit
Where:
• Git = net Gini coefficient (post-tax, post-transfer)
• GDPit = real growth Gross Domestic Product.
3Harmonised unemployment rates define the unemployed as people of working age who are without
work, are available for work, and have taken specific steps to find work. The uniform application of this
definition results in estimates of unemployment rates that are more internationally comparable than
estimates based on national definitions of unemployment. This indicator is measured in numbers of
unemployed people as a percentage of the labour force and it is seasonally adjusted, OECD database.
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• CPIit = Consumer Price Index, inflation is measured in terms of the annual growth
rate and in index, 2010 base year.
• Uit = Harmonised Unemployment Rate, this indicator is measured in numbers of
unemployed people as a percentage of the labour force.
• S_ratet = the Shadow Interest rate proposed by Wu and Xia for European Central
Bank.
• d2008 = dummy variable, 1 if Time > 2008, to investigate the impact of financial
crisis.
• dGDP = interaction effect between the dummy variable d2008 and the macroeco-
nomic variable GDPit.
• dCPI = interaction effect between the dummy variable d2008 and the macroeconomic
variable CPIit.
• dU = interaction effect between the dummy variable d2008 and the macroeconomic
variable Uit.
• αi = time-invariant effect.
• εit = error term.
4.2 Econometric Structure
In line with our dataset we implement a panel data model.
Consistent to the above econometric literature, panel data considers both the cross sectional
and time series component, where i denotes the cross section units and t denotes the time
series.
The main distinction between the available linear panel data models is that between FE
model and RE model.
Starting from the same equation for the model
yit = β
′xit + αi + εit, (4.1)
where εit = αi + υit
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The two models differ in the assumption about αi. The FE model assumes that
the country effect is correlated with the regressors whereas the RE model assumes the
uncorrelation, but both of them assumes the uncorrelation between αi and υit.
Before applying the test to choose between the two mentioned models, we develop test
to verify poolability of the data.
The test is applied to the following models:
yit = β
′xit + υit, (4.2)
yit = β
′xit + αi + υit, (4.3)
testing if country effect is necessary or not.
Consequently the null hypothesis considers the adoption of OLS model without country
effect, whereas the alternative include it.
To apply the test with the software Stata, we develop a regression with the fixed effect
(fe) option.
The F test with the hypothesis that all αi = 0 allows us to choose between FE or OLS.
Rejecting the null hypothesis suggests the the OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent,
subjected to a probably omission variables problem.
This test is available even for the RE model, applying the xttest0 function with the
Stata software after the regression with the random effect (re) option. Applying the test
for RE and FE models, we observe that both of them show the rejection of the null,
consequently we include in both of models the country effect αi.
• Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test for random effects
Var(u) = 0
chibar2(01) = 806.02
Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000
• F test that all u_i = 0, for fixed effects
F(10,163) = 415.53
sargan-Hansen statistic 40.222 Chi-sq(7)
Prob > F = 0.0000
As previously introduced RE and FE models differ in the assumption of the correlation
between the individual specific effect and the regressors.
FE assumes the correlation between the time invariant factor and the regressors. In line
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with this consideration, FE model, probably is more appropriate for our dataset as the
individual effect αi (the specific characteristics of countries) appears to be correlated to
the other regressors.
To check this intuition in Stata, we perform the xtoverid function, applying a test to select
the correct model between RE and FE. The test suggests a FE model.
• Test of overidentifying restrictions: fixed vs random effects
Cross-section time-series model
sargan-Hansen statistic 40.222 Chi-sq(7)
P-value = 0.0000
This test works in the same way of Hausman test under a homoscedasticity condition,
whereas the xtoverid test is robust to heteroscedasticity.
Including in the model the country effect we obtained the following model:
yit = β
′xit + εit, (4.4)
where εit=αi+ υit.
Furthermore to understand if the individual-invariant effect λt is not significance for
our dataset, we develop a test.
In Stata we apply the testparm command after the fixed effect regression adding the
individual-invariant term.
Since we accept the null that λt are jointly equal to 0, we exclude the individual time
effect from our model.
In line to the task of our research we include in the model a dummy variable and the
interaction effects between the dummy and macroeconomic variables.
Thus after the regression of fixed-effect model we perform the test to investigate the joint
significance of interaction effects.
Since the null is rejected we include in the model the interaction effects.
After these considerations, since the error structure of the basic FE model considers
homoscedastic disturbances with the same variances across time and individuals, we check
this assumption that can be restrictive in a panel data context.
In the presence of heteroscedasticity we will obtain biased standard errors of the estimates,
consequently we should correct the standard errors applying robust option.
In a panel data context the possible heteroscedasticity problem is probable link to the
cross section units, the so called groupwise heteroscedasticity, where the variance is the
same within cross sectional units and the error structure is heteroscdastic across them.
With the Stata function xttest3 we test for groupwise heteroscedasticity in fixed effect
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regression model.
Rejecting the null the results show the presence of heteroscedasticity.
Furthermore, in order to obtain unbiased estimates of standard error and get efficient
results, we have to check the presence of serial correlation in the panel data model,
implementing the test proposed by Wooldridge (2002)4.
To verify serial correlation in Stata we follow the xtserial command by David Drukker,
that executes a Wald test.
Since the null hypothesis is no-first order autocorrelation, our data lead to reject the null.
In line with Pesaran (2015) [8], Ignoring cross-sectional dependence of errors can have
serious consequences, and the presence of some form of cross-section correlation of errors
in panel data applications in economics is likely to be the rule rather then the exception.
In Stata the xttest2 command developed the Breusch-Pagan test of independence in the
residuals of FE regression model.
Since the regression with the fe option assumes independence in the error, considering a
panel data context a possible deviation from independent errors can arise from contempo-
raneous correlation across cross sectional units.
With the null hypothesis of independence, the test, rejecting the null, suggests the presence
of cross sectional dependence.
Following to the above results and considerations, we have to correct the error structure
of our model in order to obtain unbiased estimates of standard errors.
For this purpose, we follow the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator.
Driscoll and Kraay developed an estimator which provides standard errors that are con-
sistent and robust to heteroscedasticity and cross section dependence. This estimator is
implemented in Stata by Daniel Hoecle, with the xtscc command, estimating FE model
using Driscoll and Kraay standard errors, the error structure takes into account for
correlation between panels, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
Starting from this analysis of a static panel model where the fixed effect model with
Discoll and Kraay estimator appears the best choice for our dataset, we perform further
an analysis adding the lagged dependent variable. In order to check if the "history" of
our dependent variable is important, we developed a dynamic panel data model. In the
static panel data model, the presence of serial correlation is overcome with the adoption
of robust standard errors.
But in this way, the information remains in the error term, modifying the error structure.
But when is reasonable to consider thhe lagged dependent variable, supposing the signifi-
cant relationship between yit and yi,t−1, the solution should not be the robust option but
specify a dynamic panel model. In this sense we develop a dynamic panel model adding
4by taking the first difference, Wooldridge(2002) first estimates the parameters obtaining the residuals,
then develops a regression for the residuals on their lags with first differenced variables, testing that the
coefficient is equal to 0.5.
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Table 4.1:
Command Option SE estimates are robust
to disturbances being
xtreg robust heteroscedatic
xtreg cluster() heteroscedastic
and autocorrelated
xtscc heteroscedastic, autocorrelated
and cross-sectionally dependent
the lagged value of Gini coefficient.
To do so we use the Stata command xtlsdvc proposed by Bruno.
Chapter 5
Results
In line with the selected model, this part shows the results.
In order to verify them we perform several robustness checks. The software used for the
research is Stata.
5.1 Empirical Results
We tried to identify a correct model for our dataset. It is useful comparing the obtained
results looking at the single table 5.1 on the next page. Starting from the preliminary
analysis, first we tried to understand which was the better model between pooled OLS,
Random Effect and Fixed effect model.
As mentioned in the section 4.2, the first test suggests that pooled OLS model is not good
for our dataset, thus the test suggests to use fixed effect.
We developed some tests to identify technical problems as heteroscedasticity, serial cor-
relation and cross section dependence, concluding the presence of both of three conditions.
In line with these considerations the final model selected for our interpretations is the
number 4, the fixed effect model with Driscoll and Kraay estimator for the standard errors.
This model overcomes all the above problems, estimating robust standard errors.
We also perform a dynamic model but we prefer to use the static model for our analysis .
The problem is that estimating a dynamic panel model can lead to find a very significance
of the lagged dependent variable Gini and a not significance for the other variables.
Nevertheless, a static model can show that the other variables probably are important to
explain the relations. From a prediction point of view, probably the dynamic model is
more appropriate, but it could reveal us that Gini coefficient "this year" will be high for
countries that had higher Gini index in the "previous year".
But in this way we are not able to capture what generated the high Gini index in the past.
Therefore a static model may be more useful since we are not interested to the coefficient
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Table 5.1: Dependent Variable Gini coefficient
Variable Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled OLS Random Effect corrected LSDV Discroll and
Kraay (Fe)
G
L1. 0.9695 ***
(0.0259)
GDP -0.0254 0.1012 ** -0.0211 0.0981 ***
(0.1313) (0.0327) (0.0115) (0.0121)
CPI 1.6168 *** 0.1476* -0.0354 0.1166 *
(0.2491) (0.0723) (0.0216) (0.0526)
U 0.5438 *** 0.0185 -0.0106 0.0018
(0.1079) (0.0378) (0.0127) (0.0491)
S_rate 0.1794 -0.0962 0.0354 * -0.0977 **
(0.2280) (0.0506) (0.0150) (0.0271)
d2008 4.3797 ** 0.1473 -0.2664 0.0296
(1.5578) (0.0376) (0.1383) (0.4242)
dGDP 0.0282 -0.0951 * 0.0242 -0.0917 ***
(0.1587) (0.0376) (0.0128) (0.0165)
dCPI -1.4821 *** -0.0882 0.0610 * -0.0599
(0.3341) (0.0870) (0.0280) (0.0746)
dU -0.1433 0.0311 0.0272 ** 0.0391
(0.1208) (0.0329) (0.0103) (0.0489)
cons 20.8693 *** 28.9923 *** 29.1900 ***
(1.2960) (0.6894) (0.3938)
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
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of the lagged dependent variable. Furthermore, the small T dimension of our dataset leads
to exclude the adoption of dynamic panel.
Observing the table 5.1 on the facing page, some variables are not significant:
• Uit: unemployment rate is not significant even if we should expect a significance
positive effect. For our empirical data, the rise of unemployment rate does not lead
to an increase in the Gini index.
The significant variables are the following:
• GDPit: the annual growth rate of GDP is significant at 99,99% confidence level.
In particular the increase of one unit of GDP growth leads to to an increase in
the Gini coefficient of 0.098, thus income inequality. This positive effect is the
opposite of what we supposed, actually a positive GDP growth generally indicates
an improvement in the economic conditions in the country.
• CPIit: inflation is significant at 95% confidence level. The coefficient shows a positive
relation of 0.1166, supporting our previous considerations on the expected effect.
• S_ratet: shadow interest rate that identifies the ECB’s monetary policy stance is
significant at 99% confidence level. The coefficient reveals a negative effect of -0.0977
on the Gini coefficient. An increase in the shadow rate leads to a decrease of Gini
index. An increase in the shadow rate is associated to a restrictive monetary policy
while a decrease in the shadow rate correspond to an expensive monetary policy.
• dGDP : the interaction effect between d2008 and GDP is significant. Therefore there
is an effect of financial crisis on the GDP growth variable.
Therefore by analysing the results for the entire period 1999-2015, the significant
correlation between the shadow interest rate and the Gini coefficient shows that there is
an effect of ECB’s monetary policy on income inequality.
The effect of the coefficient (-0.0977) exhibits a negative effect.
An increase (decrease) in the shadow rate leads to a decrease (increase) in Gini coefficient.
From these considerations a restrictive (accommodative) monetary policy associated to
an increase (decrease) in the shadow rate lead to an decrease (increase) in income inequality.
5.2 Robustness
In order to support the previous results, we developed two robustness checks.
First, we performed the same analysis excluding the first 3 years from 1999 to 2002.
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Although the ECB formally started its operations in 1999, consolidating the single monetary
policy, there was a transition phase of three years leading to the replacement of the national
currency by euro banknotes and coins. Greece consolidates the third stage of the European
monetary union on 1 January 2001 and on 1 January 2002, the euro banknotes are
introduced.
In order to these considerations, given that the first three years, 1999-2001 could affect
results, we developed a robustness test to check this possible effect.
Looking at table 5.2 on the next page, we can observe that the results are in line with the
baseline model.
There are some variables that become significant but considering the sign, the significance
and comparing to the significance variables in the baseline model, we can conclude that
they deviate from those of baseline model but not in a robust way. In particular for the
variable S_ratet.
Second, in order to support the results we decomposed the sample in two subsamples.
The first considers the period 1999-2008 and the second the period 2009-2015.
We developed this test to identify possible variation of the coefficient taking into account
the period before and after the implementation of unconventional monetary policies.
The table 5.3 on page 40 shows the results, some of them appear contradictory.
For the GDP the results support those of the baseline model. Actually the fact that the
variable is positive significant only in the second period support the positive effect of GDP
and the interaction effect dGDP in the baseline model.
For the CPI, the results appear in line for significance and sign but only in the second
period.
The shadow interest rate remain negatively significant but only in second period. This
supports the results of the baseline model but it indicates that the effect is significance
after the financial crisis with the implementation of unconventional monetary policies.
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Table 5.2: Robustness check: sample without 1999-2001
Variable Estimator: Driscoll and Kraay (Fe)
Baseline sample Without 1999-2001
GDP 0.0981 *** 0.0670 *
(0.0121) (0.0249)
CPI 0.1166 * 0.0687 *
(0.0526) (0.0311)
U 0.0018 -0.0963 *
(0.0491) (0.0354)
S_rate -0.0977 ** -0.0535 **
(0.0271) (0.0151)
d2008 0.0296 -0.9053 ***
(0.4242) (0.1772)
dGDP -0.0917 *** -0.0509
(0.0165) (0.0262)
dCPI -0599 -0.0238
(0.0746) (0.0476)
dU 0.0391 0.1472 ***
(0.0489) (0.0276)
cons 29.1900 *** 30.0589 ***
(0.3938) (0.2468)
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
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Table 5.3: Robustness check: Subsample 1999-2008 and Subsample 2009-2015
Variable Estimator: Driscoll and Kraay (Fe)
Baseline sample Subsample Subsample
1999-2008 2009-2015
GDP 0.0981 *** 0.0865 0.0068 **
(0.0121) (0.0456) (0.0014)
CPI 0.1166 * 0.0668 0.0283 *
(0.0526) (0.0414) (0.0081)
U 0.0018 0.1299 * 0.0319 **
(0.0471) (0.0354) (0.0060)
S_rate -0.0977 ** -0.1142 -0.0660 *
(0.0271) (0.0634) (0.0180)
d2008 0.0296
(0.4242)
dGDP -0.0917 ***
(0.0165)
dCPI -0599
(0.0746)
dU 0.0391
(0.0489)
cons 29.1900 *** 28.4314 *** 29.3552 ***
(0.3938) (0.4086) (0.0775)
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Chapter 6
Conclusions
Looking at the trend of income inequality across developed countries in the past four
decades, we observe a clear increase.
Consequently, the research largely analysed the possible economic and financial implica-
tions of this trend.
Only recently, (conventional and unconventional) monetary policy has been put under
scrutiny, with the goal of ascertain whether and how it plays some role in the increasing
income inequality.
This thesis contributes to the strand of research analysing the effect of ECB’s monetary
policy on income inequality, measured by Gini index.
In particular, this analysis improves the existing literature in three ways: first, we employed
a panel data model, using a panel of 11 EMU countries instead of just one for the period
from 1999 to 2015; secondly we adopted the Shadow Interest rate proposed by Wu and
Xia as measure of the entire monetary policy (conventional and unconventional); third,
while research has only focused on the Federal Reserve or Bank of Japan, we are the first
to explore the topic for the Euro area.
The empirical part of the thesis discusses the selection of the correct model for our dataset.
After testing all possible models, we decided to implement a fixed effect model with
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. In line with this decision, the results suggest a negative
effect of Shadow Interest rate, that measures the ECB’s monetary policy stance, on the
Gini coefficient.
As described in Coibon et al. (2012), there are some transmission channels through which
monetary policy affects income distribution. They differently influence the low and high
income households.
During the expansionary monetary policy, the income composition, the financial segmenta-
tion, and the portfolio channels could lead to better conditions for high income households
improving income inequality.
As a matter of fact since high income households tend to hold more securities, be more
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related to financial markets, and rely more on financial earnings, they might gain more
from an expansionary monetary policy that usually affects more the price of assets.
Furthermore, one could affirm that the distributive effects of monetary policy are balanced
in the long run, declaring that expansionary policy during an economic downturn faces
the opposite effect during a restrictive monetary policy. Nevertheless it appears restrictive
considering business cycles symmetric.
As supported by Saiki and Frost (2014) in the analysis for Japan, in particular the portfolio
channel can have large effect even in the US, UK and in the Euro area, where there is a
large concentration of savings in equities and bonds held by households. This could be a
starting point for a further research.
Chapter 7
Appendixes
7.1 Appendix A
We performed some tests in order to identify possible problems of our model:
• The test proposed by Wooldridge (1992) develops a regression of the residuals in
first differences. To do this in Stata we performed the xtserial command. It applies
a Wald test, where the null hypothesis is no first order autocorrelation. Based on
our dataset the test rejects the null hypothesis.
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
F(1,10) = 1113.518
Prob > F = 0.0000
• The Stata command xttest3 performs a Modified Wald test for groupwise het-
eroscedasticity in the residuals in fixed effect regression model. The null hypothesis
is homoschedasticity and based on our data the test rejects the null.
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity in fixed effect regression
model
H0: sigma(i)2 = sigma2 for all i
chi2 (11) = 916.51
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
• In Stata the xttest2 command developed the Breusch-Pagan test for cross-sectional
independence in the residuals of FE regression model. The null hypothesis is the
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cross-sectional independence and based on the our dataset the test rejects the null.
Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence chi2 (55) = 360.906
Prob = 0.0000
7.2 Appendix B
Variable Definition Frequency Source
G Net Gini coefficient Annual SWIID
(post-tax, post-transfer)
GDP Real GDP growth rate, % Annual OECD
CPI Consumer Price Index, % Annual OECD
U Harmonised Unemployment Annual OECD
Rate, %
S_rate The shadow ECB interest rate Annual Wu and Xia (2017)
d2008 Pre and post financial crisis Annual Calculated
dGDP Interaction effect with GDP Annual Calculated
dCPI Interaction effect with CPI Annual Calculated
dU Interaction effect with U Annual Calculated
7.3 Appendix C
In order to exclude from the our model the individual invariant term λt we performed the
test to exploit the significance of that variable. In Stata we apply the testparm command
after the a fixed effect regression adding the individual-invariant term. Since we accept
the null that λt are equal to 0, we exclude the individual time effect from our model.
• Testparm i.Time
(1) 2000.Time = 0
(2) 2000.Time = 0
(3) 2000.Time = 0
7.3. APPENDIX C 45
. 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(10, 149) =   364.04             Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .97464958   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .5447443
     sigma_u    3.3777253
                                                                              
       _cons     28.81274   .3431859    83.96   0.000      28.1346    29.49088
              
       2015             0  (omitted)
       2014      .1351347   .2803597     0.48   0.631    -.4188598    .6891292
       2013      .3880806   .2855642     1.36   0.176    -.1761981    .9523593
       2012      .1522064   .3287945     0.46   0.644    -.4974958    .8019087
       2011      .0970636   .3474727     0.28   0.780    -.5895471    .7836743
       2010      .2597205   .3174763     0.82   0.415    -.3676168    .8870578
       2009      .4323867   .3180998     1.36   0.176    -.1961828    1.060956
       2008      .4486921   .3165262     1.42   0.158    -.1767677    1.074152
       2007      .3857824   .2927223     1.32   0.190    -.1926407    .9642055
       2006      .2654303   .2592096     1.02   0.307    -.2467713    .7776319
       2005      .3093286   .2406396     1.29   0.201    -.1661785    .7848357
       2004      .2212434   .2300222     0.96   0.338    -.2332835    .6757703
       2003       .350302   .2491576     1.41   0.162    -.1420366    .8426406
       2002      .3261376   .2658574     1.23   0.222    -.1992002    .8514754
       2001       .205579     .28717     0.72   0.475    -.3618728    .7730308
       2000      .1108828    .320345     0.35   0.730    -.5221232    .7438888
        Time  
              
        dCPI    -.0051128   .1128474    -0.05   0.964    -.2281008    .2178752
          dU     .0322733   .0323647     1.00   0.320    -.0316797    .0962263
        dGDP    -.1227203   .0434614    -2.82   0.005    -.2086005   -.0368401
       d2008            0  (omitted)
      S_rate    -.1291975   .0875534    -1.48   0.142    -.3022041    .0438091
         CPI     .0970967   .0860227     1.13   0.261    -.0728853    .2670786
           U     .0192351   .0378403     0.51   0.612    -.0555378    .0940081
         GDP     .1435535   .0397206     3.61   0.000      .065065     .222042
                                                                              
           G        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.2877                         Prob > F           =    0.0109
                                                F(22,149)          =      1.94
       overall = 0.1411                                        max =        17
       between = 0.2490                                        avg =      16.5
R-sq:  within  = 0.2228                         Obs per group: min =        16
Group variable: countrynum                      Number of groups   =        11
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       182
note: 2015.Time omitted because of collinearity
note: d2008 omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg G GDP U CPI S_rate d2008 dGDP dU dCPI i.Time, fe
Figure 7.1: Fixed effect estimation with individual-invariant variables
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(4) 2000.Time = 0
(5) 2000.Time = 0
(6) 2000.Time = 0
(7) 2000.Time = 0
(8) 2000.Time = 0
(9) 2000.Time = 0
(10) 2000.Time = 0
(11) 2000.Time = 0
(12) 2000.Time = 0
(13) 2000.Time = 0
(14) 2000.Time = 0
(15) 2000.Time = 0
F(15,149) = 0.42
Prob > F = 0.9702
Furthermore after the regression of fixed-effect model we performed the test to investi-
gate the joint significance of interaction effects. Since the null is rejected we conclude to
include the interaction effects into the model.
• Testparm d2008 dGDP dU dCPI
(1) d2008 = 0
(2) dGDP = 0
(3) dU = 0
(4) dCPI = 0
F(4,16) = 14.40
Prob > F = 0.0000
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